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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent  liquidity  assistance  to  failing  savings  and 
loans  and  banks  (some  insolvent  and  some  large)  in 
the  U.S.  and  similar  rescues  abroad  have  prompted 
renewed  interest  in  the  topic  of  the  lender  of  last 
resort.  Under  the  classical  doctrine,  the  need  for  a 
lender  of  last  resort  arises  in  a  fractional  reserve 
banking  system  when  a  banking  panic,  defined  as 
a  massive  scramble  for  high-powered  money, 
threatens  the  money  stock  and,  hence,  the  level  of 
economic  activity.  The  lender  of last resort  can  allay 
an  incipient  panic  by  timely  assurance  that  it  will 
provide  whatever  high-powered  money  is  required 
to  satisfy  the  demand,  either  by  offering  liberal 
access  to  the  discount  window  at  a penalty  rate  or 
by  open  market  purchases. 
Henry  Thornton  (1802)  and  Walter  Bagehot 
(1873)  develop&d  the  key  elements  of  the  classical 
doctrine  of  the  lender  of  last  res‘ort  (LLR)  in 
England.  This  doctrine  holds  that  monetary  author- 
ities  in the  face  of panic  should  lend  unsparingly  but 
at  a  penalty  rate  to  illiquid  but  solvent  banks. 
Monetarist  writers  in recent  years  have  reiterated  and 
extended  the  classical  notion  of  the  LLR.  By  con- 
trast,  Charles  Goodhart  and  others  have  recently 
posited  an  alternative  view,  broadening  the  power 
of  LLR  to  include  aid  to  insolvent  financial  institu- 
tions.  Finally,  modern  proponents  of  free  banking 
have  made  the  case  against  a  need  for  any’ public 
LLR. 
The  remainder  of this paper  is organized  as follows: 
Il.  The  LLR’s  role  in preventing  banking  panics 
Ill.  Four  views  of  the  LLR:  central  propositions 
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IV.  Historical  evidence: 
Incidence  of  banking  panics  and  LLR 
actions,  U.S.  and  elsewhere 
Alternative  LLR  arrangements  in the  U.S., 
Scotland,  and  -Canada 
Record  of  assistance  to  insolvent  banks 
V.  Lessons  from  history  in  the  context  of  the 
four  views  of  the  LLR 
II.  BANKINGPANICSANDTHE 
LENDEROFLASTRESORT 
The  need  for  a monetary  authority  to  act  as LLR 
arises  in the  case  of  a banking  panic-a  widespread 
attempt  by  the  public  to  convert  deposits  into  cur- 
rency  and,  in  response,  an  attempt  by  commercial 
banks  to  raise  their  desired  reserve-deposit  ratios. 
Banking  panics  can  occur  in  a  fractional  reserve 
banking  system  when  a  bank  failure  or  series  of 
failures  produces  bank  runs  which  in  turn  become 
contagious,  threatening  the  solvency  of  otherwise 
sound  banks. 
Two  sets  of  factors,  some  internal  and  some  ex- 
ternal  to  banks,  can  lead  to  bank  failures.  Internal 
factors,  which  affect  both  financial  and  nonfinancial 
enterprises,  include  poor  management,  poor  judg- 
ment,  and  dishonesty.  External  factors  include 
adverse  changes  in  relative  prices  (e.g.,  land  or  oil 
prices)  and  in  the  overall  price  level. 
Of  the  external  factors,  changes  in relative  prices 
can  drastically  alter  the  value  of  a  bank’s  portfolio 
and  render  it  insolvent.  Banking  structure  can 
mitigate  the  effects  of  relative  price  changes.  A na- 
tionwide  branch  banking  system  that  permits  port- 
folio  diversification  across  regions  enables  a bank  to 
absorb  the  effects  of  relative  price  changes.  A unit 
banking  system,  even  with  correspondents,  is con- 
siderably  less effective.  The  nearly  6000  bank  failures 
that  occurred  during  the  decade  of the  1920s  in the 
U.S.  were  mostly  small  unit  banks  in  agricultural 
regions.  Canada,  in contrast,  had  nationwide  branch 
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regions  closed,  but  no banks  failed  (with  the  excep- 
tion  of  one,  in  1923,  due  to  fraud). 
A  second  external  factor  that  can  lead  to  bank 
failures is changes  in the  overall price  level (Schwartz, 
1988).  Price  level instability  (in a nonindexed  system) 
can produce  unexpected  changes  in banks’  net worth 
and  convert  ex ante  sound  investments  into  ex post 
mistakes.  Instability  means  sharp  changes  from 
rising  to  falling  prices  or  from  inflation  to  disinfla- 
tion.  It  was  caused  by  gold  movements  under  the 
pre-1914  gold  standard,  and,  more  recently,  by  the 
discretionary  actions  of  monetary  authorities. 
Given  that  bank  liabilities  are  convertible  on 
demand,  a  run  on  an  insolvent  bank  is  a  rational 
response  by  depositors  concerned  about  their 
ability  to  convert  their  own  deposits  into  currency. 
In  normal  circumstances,  according  to  one  writer, 
bank  runs  serve  as  a  form  of  market  discipline, 
reallocating  funds from weak  to strong  banks  and con- 
straining  bank  managers  from  adopting  risky  port- 
folio strategies  (Kaufman,  1988).  Bank  runs  can  also 
lead  to  a “flight  to  quality”  (Benston  and  Kaufman 
et  al.,  1986).  Instead  of  shifting  funds  from  weak 
banks  to  those  they  regard  to  be  sound,  depositors 
may convert  their  deposits  into high-quality  securities. 
The  seller  of the  securities,  however,  ultimately  will 
deposit  his  receipts  at  other  banks,  leaving  bank 
reserves  unchanged. 
When  there  is  an  external  shock  to  the  banking 
system,  incomplete  and  costly  information  may 
sometimes  make  it  difficult  for  depositors  to 
distinguish  sound  from  unsound  banks.  In that  case, 
runs  on insolvent  banks  can produce  contagious  runs 
on  solvent  banks,  leading  to panic.  A panic,  in turn, 
can  lead  to  massive  bank  failures.  Sound  banks  are 
rendered  insolvent  by  the  fall in  the  value  of their 
assets  resulting  from  a  scramble  for  liquidity.  By 
intervening  at the  point  when  the  liquidity  of solvent 
banks  is threatened-that  is, by supplying  whatever 
funds  are  needed  to meet  the  demand  for cash-the 
monetary  authority  can  allay  the  panic. 
Private  arrangements  can  also  reduce  the  likeli- 
hood  of panics.  Branch  banking  allows  funds  to  be 
transferred  from branches  with  surplus  funds  to those 
in need  of cash  (e.g.,  from  branches  in a prosperous 
region  to  those  in  a depressed  region).  By pooling 
the resources  of its members,  commercial  bank  clear- 
ing houses,  in the  past,  provided  emergency  reserves 
to  meet  the  heightened  liquidity  demand.  A clear- 
ing house  also represented  a signal to the  public  that 
helo  would  be  available  to  member  banks  in  time 
1 
of panic.  Neither  branch  banking  nor clearing  houses, 
however,  can stem  a nationwide  demand  for currency 
occasioned  by  a major  aggregate  shock,  like  a world 
war.  Only  the  monetary  authority-the  ultimate  sup- 
plies  of  high-powered  money-could  succeed.  Of 
course,  government  deposit  insurance  can  prevent 
panics  by  removing  the  reason  for the  public  to run 
to currency.1  Ultimately,  however,  a LLR  is required 
to  back  up  any  deposit  scheme. 
III.  ALTERNATIVE  VIEWS  ONTHE 
LLR  FUNCTION 
Four  alternative  views  on the  lender  of last  resort 
function  are  outlined  below,  including: 
l  The  Classical  View:  the  LLR  should  provide 
whatever  funds  are  needed  to  allay  a panic; 
*  Goodfriend  and  King:  an  open  market  operation 
is  the  only  policy  required  to  stem  a  liquidity 
crisis; 
l  Goodhart  (and  others):  the  LLR  should  assist 
illiquid  and  insolvent  banks; 
*  Free  Banking:  no  government  authority  is 
needed  to  serve  as  LLR. 
The  Classical  Position 
Both  Henry  Thornton’s  An Enqhy  into th  Eficts 
of the Paper  Cmdit of Great Bri%ain (1802)  and  Walter 
Bagehot’s Lombard  Street (1873)  were  concerned  with 
the  role of the  Bank of England  in stemming  periodic 
banking  panics.  In  Thornton’s  time,  the  Bank  of 
England-a  private  institution  which  served  as  the 
government’s  bank-had  a  monopoly  of  the  note 
issue  within  a 26-mile  radius  of London,  and  Bank 
of England  notes  served  as high-powered  money  for 
the  English  banking  system.2  For  Thornton,  the 
Bank’s  responsibility  in  time  of panic  was  to  serve 
i  In theory  private  deposit  insurance  could  also be used.  In prac- 
tice,  to  succeed  in the  U.S.,  such  arrangements  would  require 
the  private  authority  to have  the  power,  currently  possessed  by 
the  FDIC,  to  monitor,  supervise,  and  declare  insolvent  its 
members.  Also  the  capacity  of  the  private  insurance  industry 
is  too  limited  to  underwrite  the  stock  of government-insured 
deposits.  (Benston  et  al.,  1986,  ch.  3).  Alternatives  to  deposit 
insurance  include  requiring  banks  to  hold  safe  assets  (treasury 
bills),  charging  fees  for  service,  and  one  hundred  percent 
reserves. 
r  Bank  of  England  notes  served  as  currency  and  reserves  for 
the  London  banks.  Country  banks  issued  bank  notes  but  kept 
correspondent  balances  in  the  London  banks.  From  1797  to 
1821,  Bank  of  England  notes  were  inconvertible  into  gold. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  19 as  LLR,  providing  liquidity  to  the  market  and  dis- 
counting  freely  the  paper  of  all solvent  banks,  but 
denying  aid to  insolvent  banks  no  matter  how  large 
or  important  (Humphrey,  1975,  1989). 
Bagehot  accepted  and broadened  Thornton’s  view. 
Writing  at  a time  when  the  Bank  had  considerably 
enhanced  its  power  in the  British  financial  system, 
he  stated  four  principles  for  the  Bank  to  observe  as 
lender  of  last  resort  to  the  monetary  system: 
Lend,  but  at  a  penalty  rate3:  “Very  large  loans 
at  very  high  rates  are  the  best  remedy  for  the 
worst  malady  of the  money  market  when  a foreign 
drain  is  added  to  a  domestic  drain.”  (Bagehot, 
1873,  p.56); 
Make  clear  in  advance  the  Bank’s  readiness  to 
lend  freely; 
Accomodate  anyone  with  good  collateral  (valued 
at  pre-panic  prices); 
Prevent  illiquid  but  solvent  banks  from  failing.4*5 
Recent  monetarist  economists  have  restated  the 
classical  position.  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1963),  in 
AMonetary  History,  devote  considerable  attention  to 
the  role  of  banking  panics  in  producing  monetary 
3  Bagehot  distinguished  between  the  response  to  an  external 
gold  drain  induced  by  a balance  of payment  deficit  (raising  the 
Bank  rate)  and  the  response  to an internal  drain  (lending  freely). 
4  Bagehot  has  been  criticized  for  not  stating  clearly  when  the 
central  bank  should  intervene  (Rockoff,  1986),  for  not  giving 
specific  guidelines  to  distinguish  between  sound  and  unsound 
banks  (Humphrey,  1975),  and  for  not  realizing  that  provision 
of the  LLR  facility  to  individual  banks  would  encourage  them 
to  take  greater  risks  than  otherwise  (Hirsch,  1977). 
5  In  part,  Humphrey’s  summary  of  the  Classical  position  is: 
‘6  The  lender  of last  resort’s  responsibility  is  to  the  entire 
financial  system  and  not  to  specific  institutions.” 
“The  lender  of last  resort  exists  not  to prevent  the  occurrence 
but  rather  to  neutralize  the  impact  of financial  shocks.” 
“The  lender’s  duty  is  a twofold  one  consisting  first,  of lending 
without  stint  during  actual  panics  and  second,  of acknowledg- 
ing  beforehand  its  duty  to  lend  freely  in  all future  panics.” 
“The  lender  should  be willing  to advance  indiscriminately  to any 
and  all sound  borrowing  on  all sound  assets  no matter  what  the 
type.” 
“In no case  should  the  central  bank  accommodate  unsound  bor- 
rowers.  The  lender’s  duty lay in preventing  panics  from spreading 
to  the  sound  institutions,  and  not  in  rescuing  unsound  ones.” 
“All accommodations  would  occur  at a penalty  rate,  i.e.,  the  cen- 
tral bank  should  rely on price  rather  than  non-price  mechanisms 
to  ration  use  of  its  last  resort  lending  facility.” 
“The  overriding  objective  of the  lender  of last resort  was  to pre- 
vent  panic-induced  declines  in  the  money  stock.  .  .  .”  (Hum- 
phrey,  1975  p.9) 
stability  in the  United  States  (also see Cagan,  1965). 
According  to them,  the  peculiarities  of the  nineteenth 
century  U.S.  banking  system  (unit  banks,  fractional 
reserves,  and  pyramiding  of reserves  in New  York) 
made  it highly  susceptible  to banking  panics.  Federal 
deposit  insurance  in  1934  provided  a remedy  to this 
vulnerability.  It served  to assure  the  public  that  their 
insured  deposits  would  not  be lost,  but would  remain 
readily  available. 
Friedman  and  Schwartz  highlight  the  importance 
in the pm-FDIC  system  of timely judgment  by strong 
and responsible  leadership  in intervening  to allay the 
public’s  fear.  Before  the  advent  of the  Fed,  the  New 
York  Clearing  House  issued  clearing  house  certifi-  _ 
cates  and suspended  convertibility,  and,  on occasion, 
the  Treasury  conducted  open  market  operations.  In 
two  episodes,  these  interventions  were  successful; 
in three  others,  they  were  not  effective  in prevent- 
ing  severe  monetary  contraction.  The  Federal 
Reserve  System,  established  in part  to provide  such 
leadership,  failed  dismally  in  the  1929-33  contrac- 
tion.  According  to  Friedman  and  Schwartz,  had  the 
Fed  conducted  open  market  operations  in  1930  and 
1931  to  provide  the  reserves  needed  by  the  bank- 
ing system,  the  series  of bank  failures  that  produced 
the  unprecedented  decline  in the  money  stock  could 
have  been  prevented. 
Schwartz  (1986)  argues  that  all the  important  fman- 
cial  crises  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United 
States  occurred  when  the  monetary  authorities 
failed  to  demonstrate  at  the  beginning  of  a  distur- 
bance  their  readiness  to  meet  all demands  of sound 
debtors  for loans  and  of depositors  for cash.  Finally, 
she views  deposit  insurance  as not  necessary  to pre- 
vent  banking  panics.  It was  successful  after  1934  in 
the  U.S.  because  the  lender  of  last  resort  was 
undependable.  Had  the  Fed  acted  on Bagehot’s  prin- 
ciples,  federal  deposit  insurance  would  not  have  been 
necessary,  as the  record  of other  countries  with stable 
banking  systems  but  no  federal  deposit  insurance 
attests. 
Meltzer  (1986)  argues  that  a central  bank  should 
allow  insolvent  banks  to fail, for  not  to  do  so would 
encourage  financial  institutions  to take  greater  risks. 
Following  such  an approach  would  “separate  the  risk 
of individual  financial  failures  from  aggregate  risk  by 
establishing  principles  that  prevent  banks’  liquidity 
problems  from  generating  an  epidemic  of insolven- 
cies”  (p.  85).  The  worst  cases  of  financial  panics, 
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did  not  follow  Bagehotian  principles.“6 
Goodfriend-King  and  the  Case  for 
Open  Market  Operations 
Goodfriend  and King (1988)  argue  strongly  for the 
exercise  of  the  LLR  function  solely  by  the  use  of 
open  market  operations  to augment  the  stock  of high- 
powered  money;  they  define  this as monetary  policy. 
Sterilized  discount  window  lending  to  particular 
banks,  which  they  refer  to  as  banking  policy,  does 
not  involve  a change  in high-powered  money.  They 
regard  banking  policy  as redundant  because  they  see 
sterilized  discount  window  lending  as  similar  to 
private  provision  of  line-of-credit  services;  both 
require  monitoring  and  supervision,  and  neither 
affects the  stock  of high-powered  money.7  Moreover, 
they  argue  that  it is not  clear  that  the  Fed  can  pro- 
vide  such  services  at a lower cost than  can the private 
sector.  Goodfriend  (1989)  suggests  that  one  reason 
the  Fed  may  currently  be  able  to  extend  credit  at 
a lower  cost  is that  it  can  make  fully  collateralized 
loans  to  banks,  whereas  private  lenders  cannot  do 
so under  current  regulations.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
availability  of these  fully collateralized  discount  win- 
dow  loans  to  offset  funds  withdrawals  by uninsured 
depositors  and others  may on occasion  permit  delays 
in the  closing  of insolvent  banks8  Goodfriend  regards 
government-provided  deposit  insurance  as basically 
a  substitute  for  the  portfolio  diversification  of  a 
nationwide  branch  banking  system.  By itself,  how- 
ever,  deposit  insurance  without  a LLR  commitment 
6  Meltzer  (1986)  succinctly  restates  Bagehot’s  four  principles: 
“The  central  bank  is the  only lender  of last resort  in a monetary 
system  such  as  ours.” 
“To  prevent  Squid  banks  from  closing,  the  central  bank  should 
lend  on  any  collateral  that  is marketable  in the  ordinary  course 
of  business  when  there  is  a panic  .  .  .” 
“Central  bank  loans,  or  advances,  should  be  made  in  large 
amounts,  on demand,  at a rate of interest  above  the  market  rate.” 
“The  above  three  principles  of central  bank  behavior  should  be 
stated  in advance  and followed  in a crisis.”  (Meltzer,  1986, p. 83) 
7  Like  Goodfriend  and  King,  Friedman  (1960)  earlier  argued 
for  use  of open  market  operations  exclusively  and  against  the 
use  of the  discount  window  as  an  unnecessary  form  of discre- 
tion  which  “involves  special  governmental  assistance  to  a par- 
ticular  erouo  of financial  institutions”  (D. 38).  Also  see  Hirsch 
(1977)&d’Goodhart  (1988)  for  the  &gum&t  that  Bagehot’s 
rule  was  really  designed  for  a  closely  knit/cartelized  banking 
system  such  as  the  London  clearing  banks. 
8  Cagan  (1988)  in his  comment  on Goodfriend  and  King  makes 
the  case  for  retention  of discount  window  lending  in  the  case 
of “a flight  to  quality”.  In  that  case,  the  discount  window  can 
be used  to provide  support  to particular  sectors  of the  economy 
which  have  had  banking  services  temporarily  curtailed. 
to  provide  high-powered  money  in  times  of  stress 
is  insufficient  to  protect  the  banking  system  as  a 
whole  from  aggregate  shock. 
The  Case  for  Central  Bank  Assistance  to 
Insolvent  Banks 
Charles  Goodhart  (1985,  1987)  advocates  tem- 
porary  central  bank  assistance  to insolvent  banks.  He 
argues  that  the,  distinction  between  illiquidity  and 
insolvency  is a myth,  since banks  requiring  LLR  sup- 
port  because  of “illiquidity  will in most  cases  already 
be  under  suspicion  about  .  .  .  solvency.”  Further- 
more  “because  ‘of the  difficulty  of valuing  [the  dis- 
tressed  bank’s]  assets,  a  Central  Bank  will  usually 
have  to take  a decision  on last resort  support  to meet 
an  immediate  liquidity  problem  when  it knows  that 
there  is a doubt  about  solvency,  but  does  not  know 
just  how bad the  latter  position  actually is” (Goodhart, 
1985,  p.  35). 
He  also argues  that  by withdrawing  deposits  from 
an  insolvent  bank  in  a flight  to  quality,  a borrower 
severs  the valuable  relationship  with his banker.  Loss 
of this  relationship,  based  both  on  trust’and  agent- 
specific  information,  adds  to  the  cost  of  flight, 
making  it less  likely  to occur.  Replacing  such  a con- 
nection  requires  costly  search,  a process  which  im- 
poses  losses  (and  possible  bankruptcy)  on  the  bor- 
rowers.  To  protect  borrowers,  Goodhart  would  have 
the  central  bank  recycle  funds  back  to  the  troubled 
bank. 
Solow  (1982)  also  is  sympathetic  to  assisting  in- 
solvent  banks.  According  to him,  the  Fed  is respon- 
sible  for  the  stability  of the  whole  financial  system. 
He  argues  that  any  bank  failure,  especially  a large 
one,  reduces  confidence  in  the  whole  system.  To 
prevent  a loss  of confidence  caused  by a major  bank 
failure  from  spreading  to  the  rest  of  the  banking 
system,  the  central  bank  should  provide  assistance 
to  insolvent  banks.  However,  such  a policy  creates 
a moral  hazard,  as banks  respond  with  greater  risk- 
taking  and  the  public  loses  its  incentive  to  monitor 
them. 
Free  Banking: 
The  Case  against  Any  Public  LLR 
Proponents  of free  banking  have  denied  the  need 
for  any  government  authority  to  serve  as lender  of 
last resort.  They  argue  that  the  only reason  for bank- 
ing panics  is legal restrictions  on the  banking  system. 
In the  absence  of such  restrictions,  the  free  market 
would  produce  a panic-proof  banking  system. 
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important  restrictions  are  the  prohibition  of nation- 
wide  branch  banking  in the  U.S.  and the  prohibition 
everywhere  of free  currency  issue  by  the  commer- 
cial  banking  system.  Nationwide  branch  banking 
would  allow  sufficient  portfolio  diversification  to 
prevent  relative  price  shocks  from  causing  banks  to 
fail.  Free  note  issue  would  allow  banks  to  supply 
whatever  currency  individuals  may  demand. 
Free  banking  proponents  also  contend  that  con- 
tagious  runs  because  of incomplete  information  would 
not  occur  because  secondary  markets  in bank  notes 
(note  brokers,  note  detectors)  would  provide  ade- 
quate  information  to  note  holders  about  the  condi- 
tion  of all banks.  True,  such  markets  do  not  arise 
for  demand  deposits  because  of  the  agent-specific 
information  involved  in  the  demand  deposit  con- 
tract-it  is costly  to verify  whether  the  depositor  has 
funds  backing  his check.  But, free banking  advocates 
insist  that  clearing  house  associations  can  offset  the 
information  asymmetry  involved  in deposit  banking. 
According  to  Gorton  (1985),  and  Gorton  and 
Mullineaux  (1987),  clearing  houses  in the  nineteenth 
century,  by quickly  organizing  all member  banks  into 
a  cartel-like  structure,  established  a  coinsurance 
scheme  that  made  it difficult for the  public  to discern 
the  weakness  of  an  individual  member  bank.  The 
clearing  house  could  also allay a panic  by issuing  loan 
certificates  which  served  as a close  substitute  for gold 
(assuming  that  the  clearing  house  itself was financially 
sound).  Finally,  a  restriction  on  convertibility  of 
deposits  into  currency  could  end  a  panic.  Dowd 
(1984)  regards  restrictions  as  a  form  of  option 
clause.9  In  an  alternative  option  (used  in pre-1765 
Scotland)  banks  had  the  legal right  to defer  redemp- 
tion  till  a later  date,  with  interest  paid  to  compen- 
sate  for  the  delay. 
For  Selgin  and  Dow&  the  public  LLR  evolved 
because  of ti monopoly  in the  issue  of currency.  The 
Bank  of  England’s  currency  monopoly  within  a 
26-mile  radius  of London  until  1826  and  its  exten- 
sion  to  the  whole  country  in  1844  made  it  more 
difficult  than  otherwise  for depositors  to satisfy  their 
demand  for currency  in times  of stress.  This,  in turn, 
created  a need  for the  Bank,  as sole provider  of high- 
9 A restriction of convertibility  itself could exacerbate a panic 
because  the public,  in anticipating  such  restriction,  demands  cur- 
rency sooner. 
powered  money,  to  serve  as  LLR.lO  In  the  U.S., 
bond-collateral  restrictions  on  state  banks  before 
1863  and  on  the  national  banks  thereafter  were 
responsible  for the  well-known  problem  of currency 
inelasticity.  Selgin  and Dowd  do not  discuss  the  case 
of  a  major  aggregate  shock  that  produces  a  wide- 
spread  demand  for  high-powered  money.  In  that 
situation,  only  the  monetary  authority  will  suffice. 
In sum,  the four views-classical,  GoodfriendKing, 
Goodhart,  and  free  banking-have  considerably  dif- 
ferent  implications  for the  role  of a LLR.  With  these 
views  as  backdrop,  the  remaining  paragraphs  now 
examine  evidence  on banking  panics  and their  resolu- 
tion  in  the  past. 
IV.  THEHISTORICAL RECORD 
In this  section,  I present  historical  evidence  for  a 
number  of  countries  on  the  incidence  of  banking 
panics,  their  likely  causes,  and  the  role  of a LLR  in 
their  resolution.  I then  consider  alternative  institu- 
tional  arrangements  that  served  as  surrogate  LLRs 
in  diverse  countries  at  different  times.  Finally,  I 
compare  the  historical  experience  with  the  more 
recent  assistance  to  insolvent  banks  in  the  U.S., 
Great  Britain,  and  Canada.  This  evidence  is  then 
used  to  shed  light  on  the  alternative  views  of  the 
lender  of  last  resort  discussed  in  section  III. 
Banking  Panics  and  Their  Resolution 
The  record  for  the  past  200  years  for  at  least 
17 countries  shows  a large  number  of bank  failures, 
fewer  bank  runs  (but  still a considerable  number)  and 
a relatively  small  number  of banking  panics.  Accord- 
ing  to  a  chronology  compiled  by  Anna  Schwartz 
(1988),  for the  U.S.  between  1790  and  1930,  bank 
panics  occurred  in  14 years;  Great  Britain  had  the 
next  highest  number  with panics  occurring  in 8 years 
between  1790  and  1866.  France  and  Italy  followed 
with  4  each. 
An alternative  chronology  that  I prepared  (Bordo, 
1986,  Table  1)  for  6  countries  (the  U.S.,  Great 
Britain, France,  Germany,  Sweden,  and Canada)  over 
the  period  1870-1933  lists  16  banking  crises  (de- 
fined  as  bank  runs  and/or  failures),  and  4  banking 
lo  Selgin  (1990)  argues  that  the  Bank  Charter  Act  of  1844  ex- 
acerbated  the  problem  of panics  because  it imposed  tight  con- 
straints  on  the  issue  of bank  notes  by  the  Issue  Department. 
However,  the  Banking  Department  surely could  have  discounted 
commercial  paper  from  correspondent  banks  without  requiring 
further  note  issue.  That  is  one  of  Bagehot’s  main  points  in 
Lombard Street. 
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all of which  occurred  in the  U.S.  It also lists 30  such 
crises,  based  on  Kindleberger’s  definition  of finan- 
cial crises  as comprising  manias,  panics,  and crashes 
and  7 1 stock  market  crises,  based  on Morgenstern’s 
(1959)  definition. 
I 
The  similar  failure  rates  for  banks  and  nonfinan- 
cial firms  in many  countries  largely  reflect  that  indi- 
vidual  banks,  like  other  firms,  are  susceptible  to 
market  vagaries  and  to  mismanagement.  Internal 
factors  were  important,  as were  the  external  factors 
of  relative  price  changes,  banking  structure,  and 
changes  in  the  overall  price  level.  The  relatively 
few instances  of banking  panics  in the  past  two  cen- 
turies  suggests  that  either  (1)  monetary  authorities 
in  time  developed  the  procedures  and  expertise  to 
supply  the funds needed  to meet  depositors’  demands 
for  cash  or  (2)  the  problem  of  banking  panics  is 
exaggerated. 
A  comparison  of  the  performances  of  Great 
Britain  and  the  U.S.  in  the  past  century  serves  to 
illustrate  the  importance  of the  lender  of last  resort 
in preventing  banking  panics.  In the  first  half of the 
nineteenth  century,  Great  Britain  experienced  bank- 
ing panics  when  the  insolvency  of an important  finan- 
cial institution  precipitated  runs  on other  banks,  and 
a  scramble  for  high-powered  money  ensued.  In  a 
number  of  instances,  the  reaction  of  the  Bank  of 
England  to  protect  its  own  gold  reserves  worsened 
the  panic.  Eventually,  the  Bank  supplied  funds  to 
the  market,  but  often  too  late  to  prevent  many 
unnecessary  bank  failures.  The  last  such  panic 
followed  the  failure  of  the  Overend  Gurney  Com- 
pany  in  1866.  Thereafter,  the  Bank  accepted  its 
responsibility  as  lender  of  last  resort,  observing 
Bagehot’s  Rule  “to lend  freely  but  at a penalty  rate”. 
It prevented  incipient  financial  crises  in 1878,  1890, 
and  19 14 from  developing  into  full-blown  panics  by 
timely  announcements  and  action. 
The  United  States  in the  antebellum  period  ex- 
perienced  11 banking  panics  (according  to Schwartz’s 
chronology)  of which  the  panics  of 1837,  1839,  and 
1857  were  most  notable.”  The  First  and  Second 
Banks  of the’united  States  possessed  some  central 
banking  powers  in  part  of the  period;  some  states 
11 Selgin  (1990),  based  on  evidence  by  Rolnick  and  Weber 
(1986),  argues  that  the  episodes  designated  as  panics  in  the 
antebellum  Free  Banking  era are not  comparable  to these  in the 
National  Banking  era  because  they  did  not  involve  contagion 
effects.  Evidence  to the  contrary,  however,  is presented  by Hasan 
and  Dwyer  (1988). 
developed  early  deposit  insurance  schemes  (see 
Benston,  1983;  Calomiris,  1989),  and the  New  York 
Clearing  House  Association  began  issuing  clearing 
house  loan  certificates  in  18.57.  None  of  these  ar- 
rangements  sufficed  to  prevent  the  panics. 
In the  national  banking  era,  the  U.S.  experienced 
three  serious  banking  panics  -  1873,  1893,  and 
1907-08.  In these  episodes,  the  Clearing  Houses  of 
New  York,  Chicago,  and  other  central  reserve  cities 
issued  emergency  reserve  currency  in  the  form  of 
clearing  house  loan  certificates  collateralized  by 
member  banks’  assets  and  even  issued  small 
denomination  hand-to-hand  currency.  But  these 
lender  of  last  resort  actions  were  ineffective.  In 
contrast  to successful  intervention  in 1884  and  1890, 
the  issue  of emergency  currency  was  too  little  and 
too  late to prevent  panic  from spreading.  The  panics 
ended  upon  the  suspension  of  convertibility  of 
deposits  into  currency.  During  suspension,  both 
currency  and  deposits  circulated  freely  at  flexible 
exchange  rates,  thereby  relieving  the  pressure  on 
bank  reserves.  The  panics  of  1893  and  especially 
1907  precipitated  a  movement  to  establish  an 
agency  to  satisfy  the  public’s  demand  for  currency 
in  times  of  distrust  of  deposit  convertibility.  The 
interim  Aldrich-Vreeland  Act  of 1908  allowed  ten  or 
more  national  banks  to  form  national  currency 
associations  and  issue  emergency  currency;  it  was 
successful  in  preventing  a panic  in  1914. 
The  Federal  Reserve  System  was created  in  19 14 
to  serve  as a lender  of last  resort.  The  U.S.  did  not 
experience  a banking  panic  until  1930,  but  as Fried- 
man  and Schwartz  point  out,  during the ensuing  three 
years,  a succession  of nationwide  banking  panics  ac- 
counted  for the  destruction  of one-third  of the  money 
stock  and the  permanent  closing  of 40 percent  of the 
nation’s banks.  Only  with the establishment  of federal 
deposit  insurance  in  1934  did  the  threat  of banking 
panics  recede. 
Table.  I compares  American  and  British  evidence 
on factors  commonly  believed  to be  related  to bank- 
ing panics,  as well as a chronology  of banking  panics 
and  banking  crises  for severe  NBER  business  cycle 
recessions  (peak  to  trough)  in  the  period  1870- 
1933 .r2 The  variables  isolated  include:  deviations 
from  trend  of the  average  annual  growth  rate  of real 
output;  the  absolute  difference  of the  average  annual 
rate  of change  in the  price  level during  the  preceding 
12 For  similar  evidence  for the  remaining  cyclical  downturns  in 
this  period,  see  Bordo  (1986,  Table  6,  1A).  ’ 
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Banking  Panics  (1870-1933):  Related  Factors,  Incidence,  and  Resolution 
Reference 
cycle 
Peak  Trough 
I  I 
United  1873  1879 
States  1882  1885 
1893  1894 
1907  1908 
1920  1921 
1929  1932 
--__---__-- 
Great  1873  1879 
Britain  1883  1886 
1890  1894 
1907  1908 
1920  1921 
1929  1932 
Deviations  from  Trend  of  Average  Annual  Real  Output  Growtha  (peak  to  trough)” 
Absolute  Difference  of  Average  Annual  Rate  of  Price  Level  Change  (trough  to  peak  minus  peak  to  trough)’ 
Deviations  from  Trend  of  Average  Annual  Monetary  Growthb  (specific  cycle  peak  to  trough)” 
Change  in  Money  due  to  Change  in  Deposit-Currency  Ratio  (specific  cycle  peak  to  trough)*” 
Banking  CrisisC  **  Banking  Panicd  ** 
Existence  of  Clear  and  Credible  LLR  Policy”’ 
I  II, 
Resolution’  l *  Agency*  l * 
I 
0.5%  -7.1%  -4.7%  2.7%  at73  NO  Restriction  of  Payments  Clearing  Houses/Treasury 
-3.2%  -  12.2%  2.6%  5.2%  5184  Yes  Successful  LLR  Clearing  Houses/Treasuly 
-9.5%  -9.0%  -9.3%  -4.3%  7193  No  Restriction  of  Payments  Clearing  Housesilreasury 
-  14.7%  -6.1%  -  1.7%  -2.7%  10107  No  Restriction  of  Payments  Clearing  Houses/Treasury 
-7.6%  -56.7%  -2.5%  2.0%  (7) 
-  16.7%  -  12.5%  -  11.7%  -27.4%  1930,1931,1932  1933  No  Unsuccessful  LLR  Federal  Resew 
--__----_--------------------------~----------~---------------------- 
0.9%  -7.1%  -3.1%  5.2%  Yes  , 
-  1.2%  -  5.4%  -2.8%  2.3%  Yes 
-0.2%  -4.4%  -2.5%  -2.2%  Baring  Crisis  1 l/90  Yes  Successful  Bank  of  England 
-4.7%  -  13.6%  -  1.6%  ,-  1.0%  Yes 
-6.9%  -  68.0%  -5.1%  4.5%  Yes 
-3.7%  -7.9%  -4.3%  -  1.3%  Yes 
Data  Sources:  *  See  Data  Appendix  in  Bordo  (1981). 
l *  See  Data  Appendix  in  Bordo  (1986). 
*  l l  Judgmental,  based  on  this  paper  and  other  research 
Notes:  (a)  The  trend  growth  rates  of  real  output  were  3.22%  for  the  U.S.  (1870-1941)  and  1.48%  for  Great  Britain  (1870-1939).  Each  was  calculated  as  the  difference  between 
the  natural  logs  of  real  output  in  terminal  and  initial  years  divided  by  the  number  of  years. 
(b)  The  trend  monetary  growth  rates  were  5.40%  for  the  U.S.  (1870-1941)  and  2.71%  for  Great  Britain  (1870-1939).  Each  was  calculated  as  in  footnote  (a). 
(c)  Banking  crisis-runs  and/or  failures.  Source  Bordo  (1986). 
(d)  Banking  panic-runs,  failures,  suspension  of  payments.  Ibid 
trough  to  peak  and  the  current  peak  to  trough  as a 
measure  of the  effect  of changes  in the  overall  price 
level; deviations  from trend  of the average  annual  rate 
of monetary  growth;  and  the  percentage  change  in 
the  money  stock  due  to  changes  in  the  deposit- 
currency  ratio. l3 
The  table  reveals  some  striking  similarities  in the 
behavior  of  variables  often  related  to  panics  but  a 
remarkable  difference  between  the  two  countries  in 
the  incidence  of  panics.  Virtually  all  six  business 
cycle  downturns  designated  by the  NBER  as severe 
were  marked  in both  countries  by significant declines 
in  output;  large  price  level  reversals,  and  large 
declines  in money-growth.  Also,  in both  countries, 
falls in the  deposit-currency  ratio  produced  declines 
in  the  money  stock  in  the  three  most  severe 
downturns:  1893-94  (U.S.);  1890-1894  (G.B.); 
1907-08;  and  1929-32. 
I3  In relating  the  changes  in the  money  stock  to changes  in the 
deposit-currency  ratio, we hold constant  the  influence of the other 
two  proximate  determinants  of the  money  supply:  the  deposit- 
reserve  ratio  and  the  stock  of  high-powered  money.  It  is 
calculated  using the formula developed  in Friedman  and Schwartz 
(1963).  Appendii  B. 
However,  the  difference  in the  incidence  of panics 
is striking-the  U.S.  had four while Britain  had none. 
Both  countries  experienced  frequent  stock  market 
crashes  (see  Bordo,  1986,  Table  6.1).  They  were 
buffeted  by  the  same  international  financial  crises. 
Although  Britain  faced  threats  to the  banking  system 
in 1878,  1890,  and  1914,  the key  difference  between 
the  two  countries  (see  the  last  three  columns  of 
Table  I)  was  successful  LLR  action  by  the  British 
authorities  in  defusing  incipient  crises.. 
Similar  evidence  over  the  1870-1933  period  for 
France,  Germany,  Sweden,  and  Canada  is available 
in  Bordo  (1986).  In  all four  countries,  the  quanti- 
tative  variables  move  similarly  during  severe  reces- 
sions to those  displayed  here  for the  U.S.  and  Great 
Britain,  yet  there  were  no banking  panics.  In France, 
appropriate  actions  by  the  Bank  of France  in  1882, 
1889,  and  1930’prevented  incipient  banking  crises 
from  developing  into  panics.  Similar  behavior  oc- 
curred  in Germany  in 1901  and  193 1 and in Canada 
in  1907  and  1914. 
One  other  key  difference  was  that  all five  coun- 
tries had  nationwide  branch  banking  whereas  the  U.S. 
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way  to explain  the  larger  number  of bank  failures  in 
the  U.S. 
Alternative  LLR  Arrangements 
In  the  traditional  view,  the  LLR  role  is 
synonymous  with  that  of a central  bank.  Goodhart’s 
explanation  for  the  evolution  of central  banking  in 
England  and other  European  countries  is that  the first 
central  banks  evolved  from  commercial  banks  which 
had  the  special  privilege  of being  their  governments’ 
banks.  Because  of its  sound  reputation,  position  as 
holder  of its  nation’s  gold  reserves,  ability  to  obtain 
economies  by pooling  reserves  through  a correspon- 
dent  banking  system,  and ability to provide  extra  cash 
by  rediscounting,  such  a bank  would  evolve  into  a 
bankers’  bank  and  lender  of last  resort  in  liquidity 
crises.  Once  such  banks  began  to  act  as lenders  of 
last  resort,  “moral  hazard”  on  the  part  of  member 
banks  (following  riskier  strategies  than  they  would 
otherwise)  provided  a  rationale  for  some  form  of 
supervision  or legislation.  Further,  Goodhart  argues 
that  the  conflict  between  the  public  duties  of such 
an  institution  and  its  responsibilities  to  its 
shareholders  made  the  transition  from  a competitive 
bank  to  a  central  bank  lengthy  and  painful. 
Though  Goodhart  (1985  Annex  B) demonstrates 
that  a number  of central  banks  evolved  in this fashion, 
the  experiences  of other  countries  suggests  that  alter- 
native  arrangements  were  possible.  In the U.S.  before 
the  advent  of the  Fed,  a variety  of institutional  ar- 
rangements  were  used  on occasion  in hopes  of allay- 
ing  banking  panics,  including: 
Deposit  insurance  schemes:  relatively  successful 
in a number  of states  before  the  Civil  War  (Ben- 
ston,  1983;  Calomiris,  1989); 
A variety  of early  twentieth  century  deposit  insur- 
ance  arrangements  which  were  not  successful 
(White,  198 I); 
Clearing  houses  and  the  issue  of  clearing  house 
loan  certificates  (Timberlake,  1984;  Gorton, 
1985); 
Restriction  of convertibility  of deposits  into  cur- 
rency  by  the  clearing  house  associations  in  the 
national  banking  era; 
Various  U.S.  Treasury  operations  between  1890 
and  1907  (Timberlake,  1978); 
The  Aldrich-Vreeland  Act  of  1908. 
Two  countries  which  managed  successfully  for long 
periods  without  central  banks  were  Scotland  and 
Canada.  Scotland  had  a system  of free  banking  from 
1727  to  1844.  The  key  features  of this  system  were 
a) free entry  into banking  and free issue of bank  notes, 
b)  bank  notes  that  were  fully  convertible  into  full- 
bodied  coin,  and  c)  unlimited  liability  of  bank 
shareholders. 
Scotland’s  record  under  such  a system  was  one  of 
remarkable  monetary  stability.  That  country  experi- 
enced  very  few  bank  failures  and  very  few  financial 
crises.  One  reason,  according  to White  (1984),  was 
the  unlimited  liability of bank  stockholders  and  strict 
bankruptcy  laws  that  instilled  a sense  of confidence 
in noteholders.r4  Indeed,  the  Scottish  banks  would 
take  over  at par  the  issue  of failed  banks  (e.g.,  the 
Ayr  bank,  1772)  to  increase  their  own  business.  A 
second  reason  was the absence  of restrictions  on bank 
capital  and of other  impediments  to the  development 
of extensive  branching  systems  that  allowed  banks 
to diversify  risk  and  withstand  shocks.r5  Faced  with 
a nationwide  scramble  for liquidity,  however,  Scot- 
tish  banks  were  always  able  to  turn  to  the  Bank  of 
England  as a lender  of last  resort  (Goodhart  1985). 
Although  Canada  had  a  competitive  fractional 
reserve  banking  system  throughout  the  nineteenth 
century,  no central  bank  evolved  (Bordo  and Redish, 
1987).  By  the  beginning  of the  twentieth  century, 
though,  virtually  all the  elements  of traditional  cen- 
tral banking  were  being  undertaken  either  by private 
institutions  or  directly  by  the  government. 
By 1890,  the  chartered  banks,  with the  compliance 
of the  Government,  had established  an effective  self- 
policing  agency,  the  Canadian  Bankers  Association. 
Acting  in  the  absence  of  a  central  bank,  it  suc- 
ceeded  in  insulating  the  Canadian  banks  from  the 
deleterious  effects of the  U.S.  banking  panics  of 1893 
and  1907.  It  did  so  by  quickly  arranging  mergers 
between  sound  and failing banks,  by encouraging  co- 
operation  between  strong  and weaker  banks  in times 
of stringency,  and  by  establishing  a reserve  fund  to 
be  used  to compensate  note  holders  in the  event  of 
failure. 
In  addition,  the  nationwide  branch  system  over- 
came  the  problem  of  seasonal  liquidity  crises  that 
characterized  the  United  States  after  the  Civil  War, 
I4 Sweden  from  1830 to  1902 had  a system  of competitive  note 
issue  and  unlimited  liability.  According  to Jonung  (1985),  there 
is  evidence  neither  of overissue  nor  of bank  runs. 
I5  Switzerland  also had  a successful  experience  with  free banks 
1826-1850  (Weber.  1988)  but  like  Scotland’s  dependence  on 
the  Bank  of‘Englanb,  she’depended  on  the  Bank-of  France  as 
lender  of last  resort  (Goodhart,  1985). 
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thus  lessening  the  need  for  a lender  of  last  resort. 
However,  the  Bank  of Montreal  (founded  in  18 17) 
very  early  became  the  government’s  bank  and  per- 
formed  many  central  bank  functions. 
Because  Canadian  banks  kept  most  of  their 
reserves  on  “call”  in the  New  York  money  market, 
they  were  able  in  this  way  to. satisfy  the  public’s 
demand  for  liquidity,  again  precluding  the  need  for 
a central  bank.  On  two  occasions,  1907  and  1914, 
however,  these,reserves  proved  inadequate  to  pre- 
vent  a liquidity  crisis and the  Government  of Canada 
had  to  step  in  to  supplement  the  reserves. 
The  Finance  Act,  passed  in 19 14 to facilitate  war- 
time  finance,  provided  the  chartered  banks  with’ a 
liberal rediscounting  facility.  By pledging  appropriate 
collateral  (this was  broadly  defined)  banks  could  bor- 
row  Dominion  notes  from  the  Treasury  Board.  The 
Finance  Act  clause,  which  was  extended  after  the 
wartime  emergency  by the Amendment  of 1923,  pro- 
vided  a discount  window/lender  of least  resort  for the 
Canadian  banking  system. 
In  sum,  though  Canada,  Scotland,  and  several 
other  countries  did,not  have  formal  central  banks 
serving  as  LLRs,  all had  access  to  a governmental 
authority  which  could  provide  high-powered  money 
in  the  event  of  such  a  crisis. 
LLR  Assistance  to  Insdvent  Banks 
The  classical prescription  for LLR  action  is to lend 
freely  but  at  a  penalty  rate  to  illiquid  but  solvent 
banks.  Both  Thornton  and  Bagehot  advised  strongly 
against  assistance  to insolvent  financial  institutions. 
They  opposed  them  because  they  would  encourage 
future  risk-taking  without  even  eradicating  the  threat 
of runs  on other  sound  financial  institutions.  Bagehot 
also advocated  lending  at a penalty  rate  to discourage 
all but  those  truly  in need  from  applying  and  to limit 
the  expansion  in liquidity  to the  minimum  necessary 
to  end  the  panic. 
Between  1870  and  1970,  European  countries 
generally  observed  the  classical  strictures.  In  the 
Baring  Crisis  of  1890,  the  Bank  of  England  suc- 
cessfully  prevented  panic.  It arranged  (with  the  Bank 
of France  and the  leading  Clearing  Banks)  to advance 
the  necessary  sums  to  meet  the  Barings’  immediate 
maturing  liability. These  other  institutions  effectively 
became  part  of a joint  LLR  by guaranteeing  to cover 
losses  sustained  by  the  Bank  of England  in the  pro- 
cess  (Schwartz,  1986,  p.  19). The  German  Reichs- 
bank  in  1901  prevented  panic  by  purchasing  prime 
bills  on  the  open  market  and  expanding  its  excess 
note  issue,  but  it  did  not  intervene  to  prevent  the 
failure  of the  Leipziger  and  other  banks  (Goodhart, 
1985,  p.  96).  The  Bank  of  France  also  followed 
classical  precepts  in. crises  in  188 1. and.  1889. 
The  Austrian  National  Bank,  however,  ignored  the 
classical  advice  during  the  Credit  Anstalt  crisis  of 
193 1 by  providing  liberal  assistance  to  the  Credit 
Anstalt  at low interest  rates  (Schubert,  1987).  Then, 
a run on the  Credit  Anstalt  and other  Viennese  banks 
in May  1931  followed  the  disclosure  of the  Credit 
Anstalt’s  insolvency  and  a  government  financial 
rescue  package.  The  run  degenerated  into  a 
speculative  attack  on  the  fixed  price  of gold. of the 
Austrian  Schilling.  ’ 
The  U.S.  record  over  the  same  period  is  less 
favorable  than  that  of the  major  European  countries. 
Before the advent  of the  Federal  Reserve  System  and 
during  the  banking  panics  of the  early  1930s  LLR 
action  was insuffrcient  to prevent  panics.  By contrast, 
over  the  past  two  decades,  panics  may  have  been 
prevented,  but  LLR  assistance  has  been  provided 
on  a temporary  basis  to  insolvent  banks  and,  prior 
to the  Continental  Illinois  crisis  in  1984,  no penalty 
rate  was  charged.  In  the  U.S.  on  three  notable  oc- 
casions,  the  Fed  (along  with  the  FDIC)  provided 
liberal assistance  to major  banks  whose  solvency  was 
doubtful  at  the  time  of  the  assistance:  Franklin 
National  in  1974,  First  Pennsylvania  in  1980,  and 
Continental  Illinois  in  1984.  Further,  in  the  first 
case,  loans  were  advanced  at  below-market  rates 
(Garcia  and  Plautz,  1988).  This  Federal  Reserve 
policy  toward  large  banks  of  doubtful  solvency 
differs  significantly  from  the  classical  doctrine. 
The  Bank  of England  followed  similar  policies  in 
the  1974  Fringe  Bank  rescue  and  the  1982 Johnson 
Matthty  affair.  In  198.5,  the  Bank  of  Canada  ar- 
ranged  for the  major  chartered  banks  to purchase  the 
assets  of  two  small  insolvent  Alberta  banks  and 
fully  compensate  all  depositors.  In  contrast  to  the 
Anglo-Saxon  experience,  the  German  Bundesbank 
allowed  the  Herstatt  Bank  to  be  liquidated  in  1974 
but  provided  LLR  assistance  to  the  market.  Thus, 
although  the  classical  doctrine  has  been  long 
understood  and  successfully  applied,  recent  experi- 
ence  suggests  that  its  basic  message  is  no  longer 
always  adhered  to. 
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SOMELESSONSFROMHISTORY 
One  can  draw  a number  of conclusions  from  the 
historical  record. 
(1)  Banking  panics  are  rare  events.  They  oc- 
curred  more  often  in  the  U.S.  than  in  other  coun- 
tries.  They  usually occurred  during  serious  recessions 
associated  with  declines  in  the  money  supply  and 
sharp  price  level  reversals.  The  likelihood  of their 
occurrence  would  be  greatly  diminished  in a diver- 
sified  nationwide  branch  banking  system. 
(2)  Successful  LLR  actions  prevented  panics  on 
numerous  occasions.  On  those  occasions  when  panics 
were  not  prevented,  either  the  requisite  institutions 
did  not  exist  or  the  authorities  did  not  understand 
the  proper  actions  to take.  Most  countries  developed 
an  effective  LLR  mechanism  by  the  last  one-third 
of the  nineteenth  century.  The  U.S.  was  the  prin- 
cipal  exception. 
(3)  Some  public  authority  must  provide  the  lender 
of  last  resort  function.  The  incidence  of  major 
international  financial  crises  in  1837,  1857,  1873, 
1890-93,  1907,  1914,  1930-33  suggests  that  in such 
episodes  aggregate  shocks  can  set  in  train  a series 
of events  leading  to a nationwide  scramble  for high- 
powered  money. 
(4)  Such  an  authority  does  not  have  to be  a cen- 
tral  bank.  This  is  evident  from  the  experience  of 
Canada  and  other  countries  (including  the  U.S.  ex- 
perience  under  the  Aldrich-Vreeland  Act  in  1914). 
In  these  cases,  lender  of last  resort  functions  were 
provided  by  other  forms  of monetary  authority,  in- 
cluding  the  U.S.  Treasury,  Canadian  Department  of 
Finance,  and  foreign  monetary  authorities. 
.  . 
(5)  The  advent  of  federal  denosit  insurance  in 
1934  solved  the  problem  of banking  panics  in  the 
U.S.  The  absence  of government  deposit  insurance 
in  other  countries  that  were  panic-free  before  the 
1960s  and  1970s  however,  suggests  that  such  in- 
surance  is not  required  to  prevent  banking  panics. 
(6)  Assistance  to insolvent  banks  was  the  excep- 
tion  rather  than  the  rule  until  the  1970s.r6  The 
monetary  authorities  in earlier times  erred  on the  side 
of deficiency  rather  than  excess.  Goodhart’s  view  is 
certainly  not  a description  of past  practice.  The  re- 
cent  experience  with  assistance  to  insolvent  banks 
is inconsistent  with  the  classical prescription.  Liberal 
assistance  to insolvent  banks,  combined  with  deposit 
insurance  which  is not  priced  according  to risk,  en- 
courages  excessive  risk-taking,  creating  the  condi- 
tions  for even  greater  assistance  to  insolvent  banks 
in  the  future. 
In sum,  the  historical  record  for a number  of coun- 
tries  suggests  that  monetary  authorities  following the 
classical  precepts  of  Thornton  and  Bagehot  can 
prevent  banking  panics.  Against  the  free  banking  ’ 
view,  the  record  suggests  that  such  a role  must  be 
provided  by  a public  authority.  Moreover,  contrary 
to  Goodhart’s  view,  successful  LLR  actions  in  the 
past  did  not  require  assistance  to  insolvent  banks. 
Finally,  the  record  suggests  that  the  monetary 
authority’s task would be eased  considerably  by allow- 
ing  nationwide  branch  banking  and  by  following  a 
policy geared  towards  price level stability.  Under  such 
a regime,  as Goodfriend  and King argue,  open  market 
operations  would  be  sufficient  to  offset  unexpected 
scrambles  for  liquidity. 
16 Although  in the  U.S.,  the  policy  of purchase  and  assumption 
carried  out  by  the  FDIC  and  FSLIC  before  that  date  incor- 
porated  elements  of public  subsidy. 
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